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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING 
A complete list of all parties to this 
proceeding in the lower court is contained in the caption 
of the case upon appeal with the exception of Summit 
County. Summit County was originally a defendant. The 
complaint against Summit County was voluntarily dismissed 
by the plaintiff prior to trial. 
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it no deference but should review it for correctness. 
] The lower court designated its holding that the Edward L, 
Gillmorfs claims are barred by "traditional notions of 
finality" as a finding of fact. The holding is in 
reality a conclusion of law ai id this court should not 
accord it any added deference simply because it was 
denominated a finding of Fact. State v. Rio Vista C\], 
Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990) 
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
3. Did the trial court err in holding as a 
matter of law that Charles F. Gillmor was not entitled to an 
easement by necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road across 
property owned by Shirley Gillmor? The court held this claim 
was barred by "traditional notions of finality inherent in 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel." 
(R. 885). The court's holding was a conclusion of law and 
this court need accord it no deference but should review it 
for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 
(Utah 1989). 
4. Was trial court's finding that the trial 
court in the Partition Action "did not intend to provide 
Charles F. Gillmor and Edward Gillmor access over parcels 
awarded to Florence Gillmor" (Finding of Fact No. 28, R. 
884) clearly erroneous as against the weight of the evidence? 
This is a question of fact, the standard of review for which 
allows reversal if the finding is clearly erroneous and 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Rule 52(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Did the trial court err in refusing to 
reform or correct the description of the Sawmill Canyon 
Road in the Partition Decree on the grounds of mutual 
mistake? This issue involves mixed questions of fact 
and law. The issue of fact is whether the trial court in 
the Partition Action intended to deny Edward L. Gillmor and 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
T w • • " • a • - ; , - < . . 
t lie Wright defendants seeking to establish a private easemen 
across defendants' property for bi g game hunters to whom 
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hunting permits had been sold as part of a commercial 
hunting operation. Subsequent to the action being filed 
Charles F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor intervened as 
defendants in the litigation and in their counterclaims 
sought an award of an easement over the Sawmill Canyon Road 
where it crosses plaintiff's property. 
B. Disposition of the Case Below 
In September 1986 Judge Judith Billings heard 
plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order to enjoin 
defendants Wright from interference with plaintiff's use of 
the road. After a day of testimony plaintiff's motion was 
denied. In September 1987 a hearing was held before Judge 
Homer F. Wilkinson. Plaintiff's motion for preliminary 
injunction, after another day of testimony, was denied. 
Judge Wilkinson ruled that plaintiff had a right to use the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for any purpose for which it was lawfully 
used prior to its abandonment by Summit County in December 
1986. (Tr. 9/25/87, page 252). The judge ruled that such 
legal use did not include hunting by permitees because the 
practice violated the Summit County zoning ordinances. 
(Tr. 9/25/87, page 253). 
2. To remain consistent with other parties herein references 
references to transcripts will be as follows: 
the hearing on plaintiff's motion for 
temporary restraining order will be "Tr. 9/30/86"; the 
hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction 
will be "Tr. 9/25/87"; the hearing on plaintiff's motion 
to amend judgment will be "Tr. 9/30/87"; and the trial 
will be "Tr. 9/20/88" 
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Judicial District Court of Summit County in the matter of 
Olsen v. Papadopulos. (Findings of Fact, NO. 9). 
The Wright property, the Gillmor Sawmill 
Property and the Sawmill Canyon Road have been used 
historically only for domestic livestock purposes. (Tr. 
9/30/86, pages 5,19,20-21-69,80,117-118; Tr. 9/25/87 pages 
30,61,156,203 and 220). 
Prior to 1963 plaintiff had no involvement 
with the Gillmor Sawmill Property. (Tr. 9/30/86, page 8). 
In 1963 a contractor (Dean Geary) was 
employed to "open up" the Sawmill Canyon Road so that the 
Gillmor's would have access to a spring on the Gillmor 
Sawmill property for livestock purposes. Geary's work 
included the development of the spring. Some of Geary's 
work in 1963 was performed on the Wright property. (Tr. 
9/30/86, pages 8, 17, 121, 122 and 130). Subsequently, in 
1982 and 1983 a contractor known as Mills repaired a washout 
in the road on the Gillmor Sawmill property and performed 
some minor work on the Wright property. In 1984 or 1985 
Wright employed Geary to repair the road upon the Wright 
property and paid him for those repairs. (Tr. 9/30/86 page 
82) . 
Before Geary performed the work on the road 
in 1963 the roadway only went to the corrals located on the 
Wright property, and from that point on (i.e., across the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property) the road was only a horse trail 
that was not passable by vehicular traffic. (Tr. 9/30/86 
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pages 9 and 68). 
Passage along the Sawmill Canyon Road has 
always been obstructed by a locked gate constructed upon the 
Wright property—i.e., the Wright gate. The locked gate has 
been maintained by the Wrights, both before and after the 
development of the road by Geary in 1963. (Tr. 9/30/86, 
pages 10, 27-28 and 29; Tr. 9/27/87, pages 63, 151). Dennis 
Wright could never remember a time when a locked gate was not 
maintained by his family, even as early as 1953 when he was 
a young boy. (Tr. 9/30/86, page 70). Only the Wrights and 
the Gillmors had access to the padlock. (id.) Bud Gillmor, 
who was aware of the Sawmill area all of his life and is now 
61 years old, could not remember a time when a locked gate 
was note maintained by the Wrights. (Tr. 9/30/86, page 
119). As a courtesy, Dennis Wright gave intervenor-
defendants and Florence Gillmor the combination to the lock 
on the Wright gate so they could have access across his 
property solely for livestock purposes. (Tr. 9/30/86, 
pages 79-80). 
Before development of the road began in 1963 
plaintiff obtained a key from Dennis Wright's father, 
Lawrence Wright to gain access through the Wright gate. 
Plaintiff told Lawrence Wright that Gillmors were building 
the road for use in their livestock operations. (Tr.9/30/86, 
pages 10 and 17). Plaintiff never told Lawrence Wright 
that the road was being constructed for any other purpose 
including the development of hunting in the area. (Tr. 
-7-
9/30/86, page 18). 
After the development of the road in 1963 the 
road was maintained by the Gillmors for livestock operations. 
(Tr. 9/30/86, pages 11 and 21). 
Plaintiff conducted no commercial hunting 
until 1982 when plaintiff sold private permits to 
approximately 20 hunters that plaintiff took to the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property for hunting. (Tr. 9/30/86, pages 
13-14 and 42 and Tr. 9/27/87, pages 31-32). They gained 
access to the Gillmor Sawmill Property across the Wright's 
property (via Sawmill Canyon Road) and set up camp on the 
Sawmill property of Charles F. Gillmor. They took in trucks 
and other vehicles, including horse trailers. (Tr. 9/30/86, 
pages 43, 57 and 75). 
According to plaintiff, he traversed the 
Wright property in 1982 for commercial hunting activities 
without seeking the Wrights' permission to use the road for 
hunting purposes. Plaintiff claims that, without 
explanation, he asked for and obtained the key to the 
Wrights' age without advising them he was selling hunting 
permits. (Tr. 9/30/86, pages 27-28). According to Dennis 
Wright, plaintiff did request his permission, which Mr. 
Wright denied. Despite Mr. Wright's refusal, plaintiff 
traversed across the Wright property the very next day. 
(Tr. 9/30/86, pages 57 and 73-75). Wright subsequently 
told plaintiff or his agents that he disapproved of what 
plaintiff had done. (]A). 
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In 1983 plaintiff again requested Mr. 
Wright's permission, which was refused. Nevertheless, 
plaintiff traversed the Wright property (although not 
along the roadway) on horseback to gain access to the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property to conduct his hunting operation. 
(Tr. 9/30/86, pages 75-77 and Tr. 9/27/87, page 34). 
Eddison Stephens, an employee of plaintiff, who managed 
plaintifffs hunting operation, removed the lock from 
the Wright gate in 1983. Mr. Wright promptly replaced 
the lock. (Tr. 9/30/86, page 77). 
In 1984 plaintiff again requested Mr. 
Wright's permission, which again was refused. (Tr. 9/30/86 
pages 13-14, 33, 57 and 85). In 1984 plaintiff gained 
access to the Gillmor Sawmill Property from across state 
lands and did not use the roadway across the Wright 
property. (Tr. 9/30/86, page 34). 
In 1985 the plaintiff gained access to the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property for his hunting operations by 
crossing the property of another landowner. (Tr. 9/30/86, 
pages 35 and 46). 
Dennis Wright never gave permission to 
anyone to cross his property between 1982 and 1985 for 
the purpose of hunting on the Gillmor Sawmill Property, and 
when requested, denied permission. (Tr. 9/30/86, pages 
86-76). 
Wright has never given permission to the 
Gillmors to use the Sawmill Canyon Road across his 
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property for any purpose other than an agricultural one. 
( Tr. 9/30/86, page 80). 
In 1986 permits were sold and defendant 
Dennis Wright refused Steve Gillmor access to Gillmor 
land across Sawmill Canyon Road. (Tr. 9/27/87, pages 
36,37 and 38). 
In 1987 Steve Gillmor built a cabin on 
property he had acquired from Florence Gillmor. One of the 
purposes for this cabin was to house hunters. (Tr. 9/27/ 
87, page 45). Prior to beginning construction Steve 
Gillmor did not obtain a building permit but subsequently 
went to Summit County and applied for a building permit. 
(Tr. 9/27/87, page 85). 
At the time Steve Gillmor applied for the 
building permit he advised the Director of the Summit 
County Planning and Building Department (the person who 
issues building permits) that the cabin would be used 
primarily for a cabin and not for commercial use. (Tr. 
9/27/87, page 193). Steve Gillmor assured the Director 
the cabin would not be used for commercial hunting and the 
Director informed Steve Gillmor that use of the cabin for 
commercial hunting would not be a permitted use of the 
cabin under current zoning classification for the 
property. (Tr. 9/27/87, page 193). The Director inserted 
language on the building permit issued to Steve Gillmor 
stating "cabin is for seasonal residential use—not 
commercial use (hunting lodge)". (Tr. 9/27/87, pages 
-10-
194 and 199). The Director further discussed with 
Steve Gillmor that if the building was going to be used 
as a hunting lodge, that he would have to file an 
application for a conditional use permit which Steve 
Gillmor did. (Tr. 9/27/87, page 195). 
The Director of the Summit Planning and 
Building Department testified that a commercial hunting 
lodge or hunting use is not a permitted use in an 
agricultural grazing zone. It is by special conditional 
use permit. He further testified that the property in 
question would not allow a commercial hunting operation 
without a conditional use permit being granted. (Tr. 9/27/87 
pages 196-197). 
The Gillmor family, for many years prior to 
December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon road to obtain 
access to their property for themselves, their employees 
and their guests to transport and tend livestock, to 
perform maintenance or construct improvements on the 
property, and for big game hunting by the family, employees 
and guests, but not including access for persons holding 
permits from the landowners to hunt big game. The road 
has historically carried a variety of vehicles including 
trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational 
vehicles, and has been travelled by persons on foot and 
on horseback. (Findings of Fact No. 10). 
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At various times during the years 1982 
through 1986, Stephen Gillmor was unable to transport 
hunters over the Sawmill Canyon Road because he was 
stopped from doing so by defendant Dennis Wright, who 
maintained that Stephen Gillmor did not have the right 
to transport paying hunters across the Wright property 
using the Sawmill Canyon Road. (Findings of Fact No. 12) 
In 1986 Stephen Gillmor discovered the 
decision in Olsen v. Papadopulos and presented it to 
Dennis Wright, who thereupon temporarily ceased his inter-
ference with Stephen Gillmor1s use of the road. (Findings 
of Fact No. 13) 
On December 24, 1986 at the request of 
defendants Wright, the Summit County Commission formally 
abandoned the Sawmill Canyon Road as a public road whereupon 
defendant Dennis Wright reiterated the position of defendants 
Wright that Stephen Gillmor could no longer use the Sawmill 
Canyon Road to transport paying hunters across the Wright 
property. (Findings of Fact No. 14) 
The Gillmor Sawmill property has been 
designated by Summit County as Agriculture-Grazing (AG-1) 
Zone. (Findings of Fact No. 16) 
The sale of big game permits by Stephen 
Gillmor and hunting pursuant to such permits, without a 
conditional use permit having been issued, was not a lawful 
-12-
use of the Sawmill Property during the years 1982 through 
1986 because such activities violated the AG-1 Zoning 
ordinance. (Findings of Fact No. 17) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff as an abutting landowner retains the 
right to use an abandoned public road for any purpose for 
which it was lawfully used prior to its abandonment. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to use the Sawmill Canyon Road 
for access by paying hunters as part of a commercial hunting 
operation because such use was not a lawful use at the time 
of abandonment of the public road. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO USE THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD FOR ACCESS BY 
PAYING HUNTERS AS PART OF A COMMERCIAL HUNTING OPERATION 
SINCE SUCH USE WAS NOT A LAWFUL USE AT THE TIME OF THE 
ABANDONMENT OF SUCH PUBLIC ROAD. 
As a general rule, once a public roadway is 
abandoned, abutting land owners have the right to have the 
roadway kept open as a "thoroughfare to the entire 
community." See, Pashall v. Valentine, 321 S.W. 2d 568 
(Tenn. 1958). Although Utah follows the general rule with 
respect to the creation of an easement for abutting land 
owners upon the abandonment of a public road, the Utah 
Supreme Court has expressly limited the extent of the use of 
the resulting easement. In Hague v. Juab County Mill & 
Elevator Company, 107 P. 249 (Utah 1910), the Utah Supreme 
Court was asked to enjoin the maintenance of a water flume 
adjacent to the plaintifffs property, which the plaintiff 
claimed interfered with his easement in a public street 
that had been abandoned. After noting that an abutting 
land owner retained a private easement as a result of the 
abandonment, the Hague court also noted that the resulting 
easement was limited to the historic use that the plaintiff 
had made of the road: 
"Respondent's legal right to a reasonably 
convenient passageway from his premises to 
the street certainly cannot be questioned nor 
interfered with by appellant. Nor can 
respondent prevent appellant from using the 
channel for the purposes for which it was 
constructed and used prior to the commence-
ment of the action. /The extent of the 
appellant's rights, however, in fluming and 
maintaining said channel are not unlimited. 
If the banks or sides of the channel were 
maintained in the street at a certain width 
and height during all of the years the 
channel had been used by the appellant, it 
may not, for its own convenience, change the 
channel, if such change interferes with the 
rights of others. (Id. at 251 emphasis 
added.) 
In the subsequent case of Mason v. State/ 
656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court again 
addressed the extent of an easement resulting from an 
abandonment. In Mason, a public highway had been abandoned 
by the state and the plaintiff, an abutting land owner, had 
been told that if he did not purchase the strip of land it 
would be sold to a third person. The plaintiff purchased the 
property under protest and thereafter sought a return of the 
money he paid. In discussing the extent of the plaintiff's 
use of the strip of land, the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
in Hague an abutting land owner had an easement and concluded 
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that the abutting land owner's use of the resulting easement 
was limited to providing only reasonable ingress and egress 
to the property: 
"Our interpretation of the abutting land 
owner's easement of access as being subject 
to precedent requirements of reasonableness 
in the circumstances accords with what we 
consider the better-reasoned opinions on 
this subject... The property owner's right 
to preserve the status quo on access to and 
over abutting highways must be qualified by 
the public interest in relocating public 
highways for greater advantage at minimum 
possible cost and in facilitating in the 
return of land to productive purposes. Thus, 
the abutting property owner has an easement 
over the abandoned highway only where (and to 
the extent that) it is 'necessary for ingress 
and egress ' ".. . (Id. at 469 citations omitted 
and emphasis added"!"". 
As a result, the use of the private easement 
over the Sawmill Canyon Road remaining for the abutting land 
owners, including Shirley Gillmor, is limited to only 
reasonable ingress and egress to the respective properties. 
That limited use must be construed in accordance with the 
historic use of the roadway during all of the years that it 
was a public road. The record is unequivocal that the 
Sawmill Canyon Road has historically been used only for 
purposes associated with domestic grazing and not for 
commercial hunting activities. 
Further, commercial hunting activities do not 
constitute activities directly associated with use of the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for ingress and egress. On the contrary, 
such activities represent a broad expansion of such rights, 
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and are inconsistent with the historical and present and 
continuing use of the Wright property and the Gillmor Sawmill 
property and the Sawmill Canyon road for domestic livestock 
purposes. Shirley Gillmorfs commercial hunting activities 
would substantially burden the estates of Wright, Charles 
F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor beyond the rights of 
reasonable ingress and egress allowed by Hague and Mason 
and would require the defendants to alter substantially the 
use of their properties for domestic livestock purposes. 
This court should not allow Shirley Gillmor to broaden the 
historical use of the Sawmill Canyon Road so that she can 
profit from the commercial killing of wild animals while 
substantially altering and burdening the use of defendants1 
properties. 
The record is clear that the property in 
question is zoned AG-1 and that commercial hunting is not 
permitted in such zone. (Tr. 9/27/87, pages 193-199). 
Judge Wilkinson (Tr. 9/27/87, pages 252-254) and Judge 
Murphy (Findings of Fact No. 17)(Conclusions of Law No. 3) 
ruled that permitting paying hunters to use the Gillmor 
Sawmill property for commercial hunting purposes was a 
violation of the Summit County Zoning Ordinances and 
therefore was not a lawful use of the property. 
Both judges additionally ruled (Tr. 9/28/87 
pages 252-2540)(Conclusions of Law No. 13) that abutting 
land owners retain the right to use a road for any purpose 
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for which it was lawfully (emphasis added) used prior to 
abandonment. (Tr. 9/27/87, pages 252-254)(Conclusions of 
Law Nos. 1 and 3). 
The use of the Sawmill Canyon Road by paying 
hunters as part of a commercial hunting operation would 
clearly be a violation of the Summit County Zoning Ordinances 
and therefore would not be a lawful use of such road. 
Shirley Gillmor would have this court rule that she is 
permitted to use the Sawmill Canyon road for any purpose 
she wants even if such purpose is illegal. Cross-appellants 
submit Shirley Gillmor is entitled to use such road only 
to the extent such use can be historically established 
and then only to the extent that such historical use is 
found to be lawful. 
CONCLUSION 
Dennis Wright, Sara Wright, David Wright, Rona 
Wright, Charles F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor request this 
court to affirm the lower court's judgment and finding 
that Shirley Gillmor is not entitled to use the Sawmill 
Canyon Road for access by paying hunters because use of the 
Gillmor Sawmill property for hunting by persons who have 
purchased permits was in violation of the AG Zoning Ordinance 
and would therefore not be a lawful use of the property. 
DATED this //^day of January, 1991. 
& 
f D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Lawyer for Cross Appellants Wright 
and Charles F. Gillmor 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of 
the above and foregoing to: 
Mr. James B. Lee 
Mr. John B. Wilson 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant, Shirley Gillmor 
185 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mr. Richard C. Skeen 
Mr. R. Stephen Marshall 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Cross Appellant, 
Edward L. Gillmor 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
this l()th day of January, 1990. 
I* 
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TabB 
JAMES B. LEE (A1919) 
JOHN B. WILSON (A3511) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as personal ) 
representative of the estate ) 
of Stephen T. Gillmor, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C. ) 
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT, RONA ) 
R. WRIGHT, ) 
Defendants, ) Civil No. 9067 
and ) 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR, ) Judge Michael R. Murphy 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, ) 
Intervenor-Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for trial to the Court, Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy presiding, on September 20 and 21, 1988. This 
matter had earlier come on for evidentiary hearings before 
Honorable Judith M. Billings on plaintiff's motion for temporary 
restraining order, September 30, 1986, and before Honorable Homer 
Wilkinson on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, 
September 25, 1987. Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor was present at 
trial and represented by James B. Lee and John B. Wilson of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer. Defendant Dennis K. Wright was present 
and represented by D. Gilbert Athay of Athay & Associates. 
Intervenor-defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor was present and 
represented by R. Stephen Marshall of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy. Intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor was present 
and represented by D. Gilbert Athay of Athay & Associates. The 
Court observed and heard the testimony of the witnesses, reviewed 
the exhibits submitted by the parties, and reviewed the trial 
memoranda submitted by the parties. The Court reviewed portions 
designated by the parties of the transcripts of the hearings on 
plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, plaintiff's 
motion for preliminary injunction and plaintiff's motion to amend 
the judgment on her motion for preliminary injunction. The Court 
reviewed selected transcripts designated by the parties from the 
trial of the "partition case", Edward Leslie Gillmor, et al., v. 
Florence Gillmor, et al. , Salt Lake County Third District Civil 
No. 223998, as well as selected exhibits from the partition case 
and the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on the appeal of the 
same case, reported at 657 P.2d 736 (Utah 1982). The Court 
travelled in a vehicle the length of the Sawmill Canyon road from 
the 1-80 frontage road to the property of Shirley Gillmor. The 
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Court continued in a vehicle to the southeast portion of the 
Sawmill property owned by Shirley Gillmor. The Court walked the 
length of Pine Canyon. The Court viewed each end of 35 Canyon. 
The Court, being fully advised in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor, now hereby makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor is the owner of certain 
real property located in Summit County, Utah and more particu-
larly described as follows: 
The south 112.0 acres of Section 21, the 
south 112.0 acres of Section 22, the south 
111.0 acres of that portion of Section 23 
owned by Gillmors, the north 316.4 6 acres of 
Section 26, the north 316.46 acres of Section 
27, the north 316.54 acres of Section 28 less 
the northeast quarter of the northeast 
quarter, total net 276.46 acres, and the 
southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of 
Sections 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains 
1284.58 acres. 
• • • 
The north 528 acres of Section 21, the 
north 528 acres of Section 22, the north 229 
acres of that portion of Section 23 owned by 
Gillmors, T4N, R5W, SLB&M. Contains 1285 
acres. 
The property owned by Shirley Gillmor as described herein is the 
northern one-half of a larger parcel of property commonly known 
as the "Gillmor Sawmill Property". 
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2. Intervenor-defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor is the 
owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located in 
Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
The south 323.54 acres of Section 26, 
the south 323.54 acres of Section 27, the 
south 323.54 acres of Section 28, the north 
63 acres of the east half of Section 33, the 
north 125.49 acres of Section 34 and the 
north 125.51 acres of Section 35, T4N, R5E, 
SLB&M. Contains 1284.62 acres. 
3. Intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor is the 
owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located in 
Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
The south 257 acres of the east half of 
Section 33 and the south 513.75 acres of 
Section 34 and the south 514.50 acres of 
Section 35, less .73 acre reserved to State 
Road Commission of T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains 
1284.50 acres. 
4. Defendants Dennis K. Wright, Sara C. Wright, David 
L. Wright and Rona R. Wright are owners of certain real property 
located in Sections 3 and 10, R5E, T3N, SLB&M, Summit County, 
Utah. 
5. The Sawmill Canyon Road, as described by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Summit County in the matter of Olsen 
v. Papadopulos, begins at the frontage road to Interstate 80 in 
Echo Canyon in Section 10, Range 5 East, Township 3 North, SLB&M, 
and proceeds in a generally northerly direction crossing consecu-
tively the property of the Wright defendants, Charles F. Gillmor, 
Edward Leslie Gillmor and terminating on the property owned by 
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Shirley Gillmor at a point commonly known as "the forks" located 
in Section 28, R5E, T4N, SLB&M. There is access by four-wheel 
drive vehicle from the forks to the eastern portions of the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property by dirt roads. 
6. The Sawmill Canyon Road is a single lane dirt road 
located in the bottom of Sawmill Canyon. 
7. The Gillmor Sawmill Property was at one time owned 
in common by Florence Gillmor, Edward Leslie Gillmor and Charles 
Frank Gillmor, It was partitioned by an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court dated February 14, 1981 in Civil No. 
223998. The partition decision was affirmed on appeal by the 
Utah Supreme Court in its opinion, Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P. 2d 
736 (Utah 1982) . 
8. The property awarded to Florence Gillmor was 
subsequently conveyed over time to Stephen T. Gillmor and/or his 
wife, Shirley Gillmor. Stephen T. Gillmor passed away in Febru-
ary, 1988 and, as of the trial of this action, the portion of the 
Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor was owned by Shirley 
Gillmor and Shirley Gillmor has been substituted for Stephen 
Gillmor as the plaintiff. 
9. Between September, 1943 and December, 1986, the 
Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road, having been declared to be 
5uch in 1943 by the decision of the Third Judicial District Court 
>f Summit County in the matter of Olsen v. Papadopulos. 
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10. The Gillmor family, for many years prior to 
December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon Road to obtain access to 
their property for themselves, their employees and their guests 
to transport and tend livestock, to perform maintenance or 
construct improvements on the property, and for big game hunting 
by the family, employees and guests, but not including access for 
persons holding permits from the landowners to hunt big game. 
The road has historically carried a variety of vehicles including 
trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational vehicles, 
and has been travelled by persons on foot and on horseback. 
11. During the years 1982 through 1986, Stephen 
Gillmor sold permits to allow persons to hunt big game on the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor, and some of 
those persons to whom permits were sold travelled in trucks to 
the Florence Gillmor Sawmill Property on the Sawmill Canyon Road 
and hunted big game there. 
12. At various times during the years 1982 through 
1986, Stephen Gillmor was unable to transport hunters over the 
Sawmill Canyon Road because he was stopped from doing so by 
defendant Dennis Wright, who maintained that Stephen Gillmor did 
not have the right to transport paying hunters across the Wright 
property using the Sawmill Canyon Road, 
13. In 1986, Stephen Gillmor discovered the decision 
in Olsen v. Papadopulos and presented it to Dennis Wright, who 
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thereupon temporarily ceased his interference with Stephen 
Gillmor's use of the road. 
14. On December 24, 1986, at the request of the Wright 
defendants, the Summit County Commission formally abandoned the 
Sawmill Canyon Road as a public road whereupon defendant Dennis 
Wright reiterated the position of the Wright defendants that 
Stephen Gillmor could no longer use the Sawmill Canyon Road to 
transport paying hunters across the Wright property. 
15. From 1982 through 1986, Stephen Gillmor used the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for access for his paying big game hunters, 
and would have used the road for such purpose on more occasions, 
but for the interference by Dennis Wright. 
16. The Gillmor Sawmill property has been designated 
by Summit County as Agriculture-Grazing (AG-1) Zone. 
17. The sale of big game permits by Stephen Gillmor 
and hunting pursuant to such permits, without a conditional use 
permit having been issued, was not a lawful use of the Sawmill 
Property during the years 1982 through 1986 because such activi-
ties violated the AG-1 zoning ordinance. 
18. While there was some minimal evidence of road 
damage by hunters, there is realistically no difference in the 
nature of the use of the road itself, whether the ultimate use of 
the various parcels is for commercial hunting, grazing or both. 
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19. There was also some minimal evidence that hunters 
are bothersome at times to ranchers, cattle and sheep, but there 
was no sufficient showing that hunters' use of the road inter-
fered with the abutting owners' use of or access to their land. 
20. Plaintiff suffered damages of $10,943 dollars in 
revenues lost as a direct result of defendant Dennis Wright's 
interference with Stephen Gillmor's use of the Sawmill Canyon 
Road for access by hunters. 
21. Plaintiff and his agents, servants and hunters did 
not trespass upon property belonging to Charles Gillmor or Edward 
L. Gillmor. 
22. Plaintiff Stephen T. Gillmor and his agents and 
hunters did not create a nuisance. 
23. Plaintiff was not unjustly enriched by the conduct 
of hunting operations. 
24. In its opinion on the appeal of the partition 
case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that historical uses of 
property are not sacrosanct and that Edward Gillmor's ranching 
activities would be affected and curtailed and that it was 
appropriate that preservation of suitable grazing lands not be 
the primary consideration of the partitioning court and that the 
land as partitioned may be less useable for grazing. 
25. Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor do not have 
traditional grazing access to eastern portions of their Sawmill 
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parcels unless they are allowed access over parcels awarded to 
Florence Gillmor and now owned by Shirley Gillmor. 
26. Thirty-Five Canyon is not accessible for grazing 
from the south. Consequently, access over intervenors* own land 
to eastern portions must be through Pine Canyon. Stock in 
limited numbers and in single file can be moved from the Sawmill 
Canyon Road through Pine Canyon to the eastern grazing area. 
Moving the stock back down Pine Canyon is even more limited, 
difficult and treacherous. Herding stock through Pine Canyon 
then does not constitute traditional grazing access. This is 
consistent with the testimony of Richard Huffman in the second 
partition trial. Mr. Huffman did not even consider Pine Canyon 
for access. 
27. Earthmoving equipment cannot create a stock trail 
through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing access. The evidence 
did establish, however, that as many as 150 head of cattle can be 
moved the length of Sawmill Canyon Road over plaintiff's parcels 
to the eastern portions of intervenor's parcels in less than a 
full day. 
28. The trial court in the partition action did not 
intend to provide Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor access over 
parcels awarded to Florence Gillmor. 
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29. The difficulty of access to the eastern portions 
of the Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor parcels was addressed 
in testimony in the partition case. 
30- The source of the "mistake" in the partition 
decision alleged by Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor is Exhibit 
46-D (Exhibit 113D in the partition case). Exhibit 46-D was 
offered in the partition case by Charles Gillmor. Edward Gillmor 
failed to review Exhibit 46-D in the partition case and to move 
to strike it as he was expressly cautioned by the Court to do. 
31. Under such circumstances, it would be inappropri-
ate and unwise to invoke the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(7) 
to grant relief from the final judgment. This is a case where 
the finality of the judgment should not be undermined over eight 
years after its entry and six years after its affirmance in 
response to assertions which suggest at the most, "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect". 
32. An order granting an easement by implication or 
necessity would violate traditional notions of finality inherent 
in the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
now hereby makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road until 
its abandonment by Summit County on December 24, 198.6, following 
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which the Sawmill Canyon Road was a private road. Plaintiff, as 
an abutting landowner, retained a right to use the road for any 
purpose for which it was lawfully used prior to abandonment in 
December, 1986. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to use the Sawmill Canyon 
Road for access for herself, her family, agents, servants and 
guests for purposes related to the conduct of her ranching 
operation, for improvement or maintenance of the property, for 
recreation and similar uses consistent with the use of the road 
prior to December, 1986. 
3. Plaintiff is not entitled to use the Sawmill 
Canyon Road for access by paying hunters because use of the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property for hunting by persons who had purchased 
permits, without a conditional use permit having been issued, was 
in violation of the AG-1 zoning ordinance and would, therefore, 
not be a lawful use of the property. 
4. Defendants are not liable for interfering with the 
use of the Sawmill Canyon Road by plaintiff for access by paying 
hunters. 
5. Plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction to 
prevent interference by the Wright defendants with the use of the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for access by paying hunters. 
6. Charles F. Gillmor and Edward Leslie Gillmor are 
not entitled to modify the Decree of Partition in the partition 
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case, Civil No. 223998, to allow themselves access to their own 
Sawmill parcels by crossing plaintiff's parcel, nor are 
intervenor-defendants entitled to an easement by implication or 
necessity for such purpose. 
7. Plaintiff is not liable to intervenor-defendants 
for trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment or accounting. 
8. Plaintiffs complaint, as amended, should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
9. The counterclaims of the intervenor-defendants, as 
amended, should be dismissed with prejudice. 
10. No costs are awarded. 
ENTERED " ' ' ' this ) 7-day of MnnJ , 1989 
BY THE COURT: 
/ < / 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JAMES B. LEE 
JOHN B»_J«LS0N 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Dated: B~ XX-^9 
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Dated: 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Wright Defendants 
and Charles F. Gillmor 
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Edward Leslie 
Gillmor 
219:011989A 
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Agriculture-Grazing Zone (AC-1) 
(1) Purpose. The AG-1 Agriculture-Grazing Zone is established to lesser, 
the danger of fire and floods, particularly in critical watersheds and in 
areas of high water tables, and to protect land for agriculture, raising 
of livestock, and production of timber. Other objectives in establishing 
the zone are: (1) to protect the water supply, the soils, the natural flo 
and fauna, and other natural resources within the zone; (2) to protect and 
promote scenic values; (3) to avoid excessive costs for public services 
which result from the wide scattering of residences; and (4) to provide and 
ensure the preservation of wildlife, especially in mountainous terrain. 
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by mountains, valleys, 
uneven terrain covered with easily combustible vegetation and drainage 
areas considered to be unsafe for dwelling purposes. 
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19. 
(4) Authorized Uses. See Section 12.20. 
(5) Special Provisions. 
(a) Vegetative Clearance. All high flammable vegetation shall be 
removed from the area surrounding flammable buildings. Extent of the 
removal required shall be determined by the Zoning Administrator. Ir. 
case of dispute, final determination shall be made by the Board of 
Adjustment. 
Wilderness-Recreation Zone (WR-1) 
^ P u r? o s e' ^ € WR-1 Wilderness-Recreation Zone is established for the 
purpose of providing homesites without disturbing the natural wilderness 
setting, the wildlife therein, and agricultural uses on adjacent properties 
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by mountains, valleys, 
uneven terrain, livestock grazing, and occasional dwellings in a wilderness 
setting. 
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19. 
(4) Authorized Uses. See Section 12.20. 
(5) Special Provisions. 
(a) Vegetative Clearance. All high flammable vegetation shall be 
removed from the area surrounding flammable buildings. Extent of the 
removal required shall be determined by the Zoning Administrator. In 
case of dispute, final determination shall be made by the Board of 
Adjustment. 
12-4 
12.18 E Snyderville Basin Dis t r i c t - SBD-1 
(1) Purpose. The SBD-1 zoning d i s t r i c t i s designed as a single "Code" 
consisting of planning pol ic ies and development regulations wherein 
development proposals are considered on their individual merits. As with 
other approaches to planning zoning th i s zone promotes the public health, 
safety and welfare by maximizing the positive impacts of development and 
minimizing the negative. 
(2) Character is t ics . This zone i s characterized by an innovative approach 
to planning and development approvals in that a permit to develop i s 
granted or denied on the basis of a proposals conpliance with pre-set 
performance standards (policies) covering a wide range of socia l , economic, 
environmental, design and public f a c i l i t i e s factors. Processing and final 
decision on a development application focus on the developers 
"evidentiary package" which consists of: an application form, plans, 
drawings and rendering, and one-page evidentiary forms for each policy, and 
coupleted by the developer. 
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Snyderville Basin 
Development Code Chapter 5, Policy, Section 5.6 Absolute Pol ic ies , Section 
5.7 Relative Pol ic ies , Section 5.9 Density, and Table 6. 
(4) Authorized Uses. See the Snyderville Basin Development Code Chapter 5, 
Policy, Section 5.6, Section 5.7. 
(5) Special Provisions, 
(a) Permits required. A Class I or Class I I development permit i s 
required for a l l developments in the Sndyerville Basin Zoning Dis t r i c t . 
(b) Lot size, frontage width, front, side & rear setbacks and 
authorized uses. Due to the uniqueness of th is development approva1 
process, requirements for Section 12.19 and 12.20 will be obtained 
from the standards contained in Chapter 5 and Table 6 of the 
Snyderville Basin Development Code. 
12.19 Lot Requirements for Building Purpose. Refer to table of page 12-5 b#c. 
12.20 Authorized Uses in Zones. In the following table permitted uses cf 
lands or building are indicated by a "P", conditional uses of lands or 
buildings are indicated by a "C", and if the use i s not allowed i t i s ei ther 
not named in the use l i s t or i t i s indicated by a "_"* See authorized use table 
on page 12.9. 
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12.20 Authorised Uee< SR-1 RR-1 RR-2 R-l R-5 AC-1 WR-1 WF-1 C-l CR-1 HS-1 LI-1 
(1) Accessory buildings and uses customarily 
incidental to permitted and traditional 
uses. 
(2) Agriculture 
A. The raising, cultivating, grazing, 
or breeding of plants or animals in 
unlimited quantities. 
B. Animals and fowl for recreation 
or for family food production for the 
primary use of persons residing on 
the premises. 
C. Agriculture industries or busi-
nesses involving agricultural pro-
duction in manufacturing, packaging, 
treatment, sales, intensive feeding, 
or storage, including animal feed 
yards, kennels, fur farms, food 
packaging or processing plants, 
commercial greenhouses, commercial 
poultry or egg production, saw mills, 
and similar uses. 
(3) Dwellings 
A. Single Family Dwellings 
B. Two Family Dwellings 
C. Multiple Family Dwellings in 
Planned Unit Developments 
D. Multiple unit dwellings for 
commercial purposes, i.e., motels, 
hotels, condomin imiitns, and boarding 
houses, providing that the density 
ol units with kitchen facilities shall 
not exceed ten (10) per acre and units 
P 
C 
P 
P 
C 
P 
C 
P 
C P 
P 
SR-1 RR-1 
without kitchen facilities, thirty (30) - -
per acre, unless it can be shown that 
adequate fire protection is provided 
to safeguard human life to justify a 
greater height than permitted in Section 
5.6 of this Code; in such cases densities 
may be increased, provided however that 
the density shall not exceed the above 
described densities for each two building 
levels above fire fighting grade. 
E. Multiple unit dwellings for com-
mercial purposes, i.e., hotels, motels, 
and condominiums, with no density re-
quirements, provided however that at 
least seventy (70) percent of the pro-
ject, excluding parking space and road 
rights-of-way, is maintained as natural 
or landscaped ope? space or outdoor 
recreation facilities, i.e., swimming 
pools, tennis courts, etc. 
F. Mobile Homes on one acre minimum lots - P 
(but in no case less than the minimum lot 
size required in the zone) and subject to 
requirements of Chapter 10. 
G. Mobile homes for housing agri- -
cultural employees and subject to 
the requirements of Chapter 10. 
H. Mobile home parks and subdivisions C C 
subject to requirements of Chapter 10. 
I. Recreation vehicle parks subject 
to requirements of Chapter 9. 
RR-2 R- l R-5 AC-1 WR-1 WF-1 C - l CR-1 HS-1 LI 
- p
 P P 
P 
p p p p p p - - - -
C - - C C C - - - C 
C C - - - - - - C -
C C C C C c C - C C 
1 2 - 1 0 
J. Farm or ranch housing for employees 
of the farm or ranch. 
) Outdoor commercial recreation acti-
vities including archery and rifle ranges, 
campgrounds, golf courses, dude ranches, 
public 8t«ble69 ski lifts, public snow-
mobile trails, and other similar uses, 
) Sales Activities 
A. Retail establishments such as 
grocery and general merchandise stores 
and novelty, gift, and photo supply 
stores
 v 
D. Service establishments, including 
barber shops, confectionary shops, 
laundromats and dry cleaners, indoor 
recreation centers, mortuary, home 
appliance repair shops, banks, and 
other similar commerce. 
C. Travel service and entertainment 
establishments such as automobile 
service stations, restaurants, drive-
in food stands, and theatres. 
D. Office buildings, including clinics, 
animal hospitals, and other office 
activities. 
E. Liquor and beer sales and places 
for the drinking of liquor and beer. 
K. Neighborhood convenience stores 
for ihr primary us*1 of the residents 
in l he immediate vicinity. 
SR-1 RR-1 RR-2 R-l R-5 AG-1 WR-1 WF-1 C-l CR-1 HS-1 LI-1 
(7) Private Service Activities 
A. Child day care or nursery C C C C C C - - P 
B. Private educational institution 
having a curriculum similar to public 
schools and approved by the state, C C C C C C C - P 
C. Private institution or organization 
recreational grounds and facilities, not 
open to the general public and to which 
no admission charge is made. C C C C C C C C C 
D. Rest or convalescent homes C C C C C C C - C 
E. Private parks, recreational grounds 
recreational camps or resorts, including 
accessory or supporting dwellings or 
dwelling complexes and commercial service 
uses which are owned or managed by the 
recreational fa* ility to which they are 
a c c e s s o r y , C C C P C C C C P 
18) Public or Quasi Public Service Activities 
A. Power generation plants, dams and 
reservoirs, transmitting stations and 
substations, and television satallite 
stations. c, C C C C P P C C 
B. Hospitals, medical clinics, ceme-
teries, and churches, 
C. Public buildings 
U. Parks 
9) Processing and Manufacturing 
/v. Quarries, grovel pits, open pit 
mines, and tunnel mines. 
li. oil wells, natural gas wells, 
and steam we I 1s 
c 
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12.21 Determination as to Uses Not Listed 
Determination as to the classification of uses not specifically listed in 
Section 12.20 of this Code shall be made by the Planning Commission. The 
procedure shall be as follows: 
(1) Written Request: A written request for such determination shall 
be filed with the Zoning Administrator. The request shall include a detailed 
description of the proposed use and such other information as may be required. 
(2) Determination. The Planning Commission shall compare the 
nature and characteristics of the proposed use with those of uses specifically 
listed in this Code, and make a determination of the classification of the 
proposed use. The determination shall be rendered in writing within thirty 
(30) days after filing. A determination approving the proposed use shall 
state the zone classification in which the proposed use will be permitted, 
whether the use is a permitted or conditional use, and shall include fir.cir.gs 
which establish that such use is of the same character as uses permitted in 
that zone classification. 
(3) Appeals. Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision 
cf the Planning Commission to the Board of Commissioners by filing an appeal 
with the County Clerk within thirty (30) days of the Planning commission's 
action stating the reasons for said appeal and requesting a hearing before 
the Board of Commissioners at its next regular meeting. 
(A) Effect. The determination and all information pertaining thereto 
shall become a permanent public record in the office of the Zoning Administrator. 
Such use shall thereafter become a permitted or conditional use in the class 
or district specified in the determination, and shall have the same status 
as a permitted or conditional use specifically named in the regulation for 
that zone classification. 
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